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Abstract 
This paper provides new empirical evidence on the impacts of state and federal mental health 
parity laws on related labor market outcomes, particularly working time. Implemented in the last 
two decades, these policies aim to eliminate differences in mental and physical health benefits 
among group health plans. The mandated benefits for mental health drive up the costs of 
providing health insurance substantially. In response, employers may avoid hiring more full-time 
workers, whose compensation includes health insurance, by increasing working time per worker 
and reliance on part-time employment.  Employees may also have an incentive to increase their 
labor supply to qualify for the benefits. Using individual-level data from the Current Population 
Survey and exploiting policy variation by state and year, I find state parity laws increase average 
weeks worked by 1.4 percent. Since self-insured firms are exempt from state regulations, parity 
is estimated to have nearly twice as large an effect on small firms as it does on large firms. 
Moreover, I study two federal parity laws and find the more comprehensive one is associated 
with 1.7 percent more weeks worked. Overall, there is no substantial evidence that parity laws 
significantly affect hours worked and prevalence of coverage.  
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1. Introduction
Group insurance is the leading source of health coverage in the American market;1 thus, the
related legislation has been politically salient for decades. The regulations of the issuance,
content, and price of group health plans are expected to reduce the number of uninsured
persons, or further, ensure the covered population can access the appropriate level of health
care. One major type of state regulation that has seen tremendous growth in the past 20 years is
mandated health insurance benefits. It requires group insurance coverage to include a particular
type of medical procedure or treatment, such as maternity care, diabetes supplies, cancer
screening, mental illness treatment, or drug and alcohol abuse treatment. These mandates
increase the well-being of workers who value such medical services because they can have better
health insurance protection under the regulations.2 However, compliance with mandates also
means the inclusion of extra medical services, which increases the employers’ group insurance
provision costs. The purpose of this paper is to examine several labor market consequences of
one typical mandated benefit: mental health parity laws that prohibit insurers from
discriminating between coverage for mental and physical health care.
Traditionally, the benefits for mental health in group insurance plans have had more
restrictions than physical health (American Psychological Association, 2010). To reinvent mental
health and substance abuse care, many states have passed mental health parity laws to require
1 Two-thirds of the nonelderly population is covered by group health insurance plans related to the workplaces of
their own or their family members; more than half of workers take health insurance from their employers (Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust, 2012).
2 According to Summers (1989), mandated benefits are similar to public programs financed through benefit taxes,
and they can save some inefficiencies of public good provisions.
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equal coverage for mental and physical illnesses for fully insured group plans.3 The federal
government has also taken steps to promote more comprehensive coverage for mental health in
employer-sponsored plans as part of the Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA), effective in 1998, and
the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act (MHPAEA), started in 2010. The MHPAEA
continues and expands the MHPA and is still active in the context of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Employer-sponsored plans, which are referred to in both federal
parity laws, include fully insured plans as well as self-insured arrangements.4 
For employers, complying with parity laws drives up the costs of providing group coverage
substantially, because those laws require insurers to pay for the mental health care previously
funded by consumers. One factor associated with the costs of parity laws is the extent of
differential coverage of mental and physical health before the legislation. The Employer Health
Benefits Survey of 1991 (Health Insurance Association of America) presents that more than 80
percent of workers covered by group insurance have mental health benefits, but nearly 70
percent of the group plans featuring those benefits impose stricter limitations on mental health
care than on physical care.  Those limitations include lower annual or lifetime dollar limits, less
inpatient and outpatient services, office visits, emergency care and prescription drugs, or higher
deductibles, copayments and coinsurance (United States General Accounting Office, 2000 and
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Research and Educational Trust, 2002).5 Therefore,
most group health plans need to scrutinize their plan design to comply with mental health parity 
laws.
3 Fully insured plans refer to the plans provided by an insurance company to cover the employees and dependents
and signed contracts by employers.
4 Self-insured plans are the health or disability benefits provided by employers with its own funds to their employees.
5 Only the 2002 survey asked a special series of questions about mental health benefits for each plan.
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The determinant of parity law costs is the amount the premium increased after adding equal 
mental health benefits to a policy or increasing the generosity of the current benefits in a
package. Many of the commonly mandated benefits significantly raise the price of individual and
family coverage (The Bureau of Labor Statistics Employee Benefits Survey, 1981-1984), and
mental health mandates belong to one of the highest-cost mandates (Gruber, 1994). According
to the cost assessment of each state mandates provided by the Council of Affordable Health
Insurance in 2009,6 mental health parity is estimated to increase the average premium by 5–10 
percent, even the minimum mental health benefits mandates and alcoholism/substance abuse
mandates increase the premium by 1–3 percent.7 
As the cost of providing group health benefits increases, several labor market outcomes may
register adjustments because the labor demand for full-time workers decreases. First of all, lower 
wages may offset the higher-value health plans if workers are paid with the same level of
compensation packages.8 Secondly, when constraints limit the ability to lower wages, employers
may want to substitute part-time workers who are exempted from group coverage provision for
full-time workers.9 Also, employers may increase working time per worker instead of adding
additional workers when considering a health insurance provision as a quasi-fixed cost of
6 CAHI’s independent Actuarial Working Group on State Mandated Benefits analyzed company data and their
experience to provide cost range estimates (less than 1 percent, 1–3 percent, 3–5 percent and 5–10 percent) if the 
mandates were added to a policy that did not include the coverage. These estimates are based on real health
insurance policies instead of theory or modeling.
7 It is possible that employers may decrease the generosity of other benefits which are not mandated; increase the
premium share of employees or other non-health fringe benefits to keep the total employment costs unchanged.
But no evidence shows that there is a decrease in neither generosity nor non-health fringe benefits because of the
parity laws (Anand, 2011). Although in Gruber and McKnight (2003)’s paper, they indicate that part of the increased 
employee contributions to premium is coming from the rising costs, but not all of the increased costs can be
transferred to employees’ contribution.
8 Compensation package usually includes direct benefits (such as wages and bonus) and indirect benefits (such as
insurance and pensions).
9 According to Internal Revenue Service nondiscrimination rules require if group health insurance is offered, it should
be offered to all full-time workers.
3
 
 
   
     
  
   
 
  
  
   
    
    
    
   
  
   
  
  
   
     
   
                                                          
    
 
   
  
 
employment. Lastly, if the provision of group health insurance is voluntary, employers may
choose to stop offering the health plan when the prices are too high; then, the average group
coverage may be reduced.
Except for the demand side, the enactment of mental health parity laws may also impact
the labor supply side in both extensive and intensive margins. The magnitude of the extensive
labor supply response depends on how much the individuals value the benefits. If the mental
benefits are valued, individuals may increase the labor supply to get workplace coverage and take
advantage of the new benefits. As for the intensive margin, parity laws may increase the working
hours/weeks. To stay in the same utility level, some full-time employees may increase their
working time to obtain more consumption goods because parity may lower the previous wage
compensations; part-time workers may also increase their working hours to be eligible for group
health insurance provisions. In addition, improvement of mental health care access may lead to
more utilization and better mental health outcomes, and there are theoretical and empirical
reasons for expecting that better mental health will increase productivity.
The theoretical prediction about the change in direction of working time after mental health
mandates is ambiguous, and consistent empirical evidence on that is also lacking;10 thus, my
paper focuses on finding new empirical evidence on the effect of parity laws on working time. To
identify causal effects, I first merge state by year policy variation to the individuals in the Current
Population Survey March supplements from 1992 to 2010. My results suggest that for 25 to 64-
10 Even though wages are predicted to be lower in theory, the existing studies about the effect of state mental health
mandates do not find a significant negative effect on wages. Thus, I look at the effect of state mental health parity
laws on hourly wages with more comprehensive policy data in a longer period, and the result is still insignificant.
Then my “reserve experimental” of 2010 federal parity law also suggests a small and insignificant effect on wages.
The results are shown in Appendix Table A2.
4
 
 
     
     
    
    
  
     
    
    
    
          
  
 
  
     
     
  
   
 
  
      
   
                                                          
   
  
year-old workers in the private sector, there is a 1.4 percent increase in weeks worked per year
in the parity states during this time period. For workers who are 35 to 44 years old, state mental 
health parity also increases their probability of working part-time by 1.8 percentage points, and
their average hours worked per week decrease by 1.7 percent due to this employment
composition change. Since self-insured firms are exempted from state mandated regulations, I
also compare the effect of the parity laws on small firms and large firms as the latter are more
likely to self-insure. As a result, state parity increases the weeks worked approximately 1 percent
more for workers in small firms than in large firms.
I then examine the effects of two federal parity laws to see whether they confirm my previous
findings. The MHPA effective in 1998 and the MHPAEA effective in 2010 can both be treated as
“reverse experiments” by making states with existing state parity laws useful as a set of controls.
The before-and-after comparisons of experimental states (that had not adopted their own parity
laws before the year of the federal legislation) and non-experimental states (that had already
adopted their own parity law before the enactment year of the federal legislation) indicate that
the MHPA has little effect on working time.11 However, the MHPAEA, a stronger federal law than
the MHPA, increases weeks worked by 1.7 percent. The findings on these parity laws pass a pre-
trend check and are robust to the inclusion of state, year, and region-by-year effects, as well as
state-specific time trends.
The variables of working time (hours and weeks worked) used in my empirical analysis can be
considered as equilibrium outcomes that reflect the information from the demand side of the
employer combined with the supply side of the employee. One of the caveats in this paper is that
11 There are two federal laws effective in different years, so the research periods of two “reverse experiments”
depends on the actual enactment years.
5
 
 
   
 
   
    
   
   
    
   
 
  
  
  
      
   
       
  
     
 
                                                          
 
    
I cannot empirically separate them from each other. Also, the most affected population, which
are workers with mental illness or with a high risk of getting sick, cannot be analyzed separately
since they are not a demographically identifiable group;12 thus, the increase in working weeks is
an average estimate for the general workers regardless of their mental health status. According
to the previous literature together with some suggestive empirical evidence discussed in the
following sections, I would like to argue my findings as an “efficiency costs” rather than “equity
benefits” story. This positive effect on working weeks is mainly driven by an increase in health
insurance costs or a positive incentive of extensive margin of labor supply, but not the better
mental health outcomes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I first introduce the conceptual
framework for the economics about group health insurance mandates, followed by an 
introduction to mental health parity and the legislative variation at both the state and the federal
level. After a review of previous literature in Section 3, I use Section 4 to illustrate the empirical
work for the effect of state mental health parity laws. It also includes data, methodology, and
results. In Section 5, I provide the “reverse experiments” of two federal parity laws following
similar steps to Section 4. Section 6 checks the identification assumptions and sensitivity of the
results. Section 7 provides a brief discussion of the mechanisms of the effect of parity laws on
working time. And Section 8 concludes.
12 If a mandate expands benefits for a demographically identifiable group within a workplace, it is called “group-
specific mandate” such as mandated maternity benefits mentioned in Gruber (1994).
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2. Background
2.1 Conceptual framework about group insurance mandates and the labor market
In this section, I discuss the conceptual framework that motivates my empirical analysis. The
existing theoretical studies indicate that the implementation of health insurance mandates raises
the costs of providing group health insurance. In response to it, the labor demand and labor
supply may both shift, and several aspects of the labor market, such as employment, wages,
working time, and group insurance coverage, may change based on the new equilibrium.
Summers (1989) considers the economics of mandated benefit proposals. His supply and
demand model shows that imposing a mandated benefit requires employers to pay more for
employees; if workers value the benefit, the labor supply increases while labor demand
decreases. A new equilibrium outcome shows lower wages and an ambiguous change in
employment. Gruber and Krueger (1991) provide a more formal model and derive that the effect
of mandated benefits on the labor market depends on the elasticities of labor demand and 
supply, the cost of the benefits, and how much employees value the benefits.
Applying the above-analysis to health insurance, Summers suggests that mandating group
health insurance should not affect the decisions about workers’ hours worked because health
insurance is a fixed cost, and workers do not get more group insurance with more hours worked.
However, Feldman (1993) argues that the income effect created by mandated lump-sum benefits
is too large to be assumed away. After imposing the mandates, health benefits improve and other
consumption goods decrease. Thus, if labor supply is treated as divisible hours, mandated health
benefits should cause employees to increase their working hours to obtain more consumption
goods and keep the same level of utility.
7
 
 
   
   
    
        
     
        
        
   
    
 
    
   
   
 
    
     
 
  
   
  
Feldman provides the mechanism of increasing hours worked from employees’ margins. On
the other hand, Culter and Madrian (1998) emphasize the mechanism that employers also have
the incentive to ask more hours from fewer workers when the fixed costs of employment 
increase. Their framework is briefly introduced as follows. Let 𝑓𝑓(𝐻𝐻 ∙ 𝑁𝑁) be the firm’s production
function, and 𝐶𝐶 = 𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑀𝑀(𝐻𝐻, 𝑃𝑃) be the cost of hiring workers. The variable𝐻𝐻 represents the hours;
𝑁𝑁 represents the number of employees. And 𝑀𝑀(𝐻𝐻, 𝑃𝑃) is a function of total compensation which
depends on the hours𝐻𝐻 and the price of benefit𝑃𝑃. The firm chooses𝑁𝑁 and 𝐻𝐻 to maximize profits:
max𝜋𝜋 = 𝑓𝑓(𝐻𝐻 ∙ 𝑁𝑁) − 𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝑀𝑀(𝐻𝐻, 𝑃𝑃) (1)
𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁 
This profit function makes the assumptions that workers and hours are perfect substitutes,
and employers offer employees a wage/hours bundle instead of an hourly wage with flexible
hours. After totally differentiating the two first-order conditions of equation (1) and rearranging
the terms, 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻/𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃 can be solved as:
𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻 𝐻𝐻 −𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 = (2)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝑀𝑀𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 
And 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁/𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃:
𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁 = − 𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 (3)
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 𝐻𝐻 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 
+ 
𝐻𝐻2𝑓𝑓′′ 
Equation (2) implies that the effect of increasing benefit price depends on the average cost
of an additional hour relative to the marginal cost of an additional hour. From equation (3),
increasing health insurance costs changes both hours worked and the number of workers
employed. And if the effect on hours worked is positive, the effect on employment should be
negative, and vice versa. To conclude: all the relevant models about the effect of benefit costs
8
 
 
   
  
  
 
  
   
    
   
    
  
   
 
     
     
  
     
    
  
    
  
                                                          
  
    
on labor market outcomes have implications for the changes in wages, working time or
employment.
2.2 Introduction of mental health parity laws
Approximately 30 percent of the US population is estimated to experience some level of
diagnosable mental illness or substance use disorder (Kessler et al., 1994). However, private
health insurance policies in the US do not cover the treatment of mental illness and substance
abuse in the same way as physical illnesses, which results in the majority not receiving
appropriate treatment. Since the 1950, mental health has been integrated into the mainstream
healthcare system since the 1950s, and it has been under the spotlight in state and federal
legislative sessions for decades. Efforts to improve the mental health benefits in group health
insurance plans dates back to the 1970s when a few state legislatures began to establish
mandatory minimum benefit levels for substance use disorder or mental illness. Until the late
1980s, the majority of legislative activities required insurers to provide only a certain level of
coverage for mental health conditions, and they were more related to substance use disorder,
especially alcoholism.
In the early 1990s, to further minimize the disparities between physical and mental health
coverage, some states began to enact mental health parity, which requires equal coverage for
physical and mental illness, for fully insured firms. To be more specific, parity laws typically
prohibit insurance companies from offering insurance plans that place greater financial
requirements or treatment limitations on mental illness than on physical illness.13 
13 Financial requirements include deductibles, copayments, coinsurance rates, and out-of-pocket limitations.
Treatment limitations include numbers of covered hospital days and outpatient office visits.
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By 2010, 28 states had mental health parity laws, although these laws vary on their scope and
application. Some states, such as Oregon and Vermont, have more comprehensive parity laws;
they require equal coverage for mental illness including all of the broad-based mental health
disorders,14 and this applies to all significant policy groups. Meanwhile, some states, such as 
California and Massachusetts, impose parity laws containing more limits and exemptions for
specific mental health conditions or certain groups.15 The other states that have not adopted
mental health parity can be broadly divided into three categories: mandated offering, minimum
benefit mandates, and no mental health mandates. Mandated offering states require the same
coverage for mental and physical illness with the condition that the insurers offer mental health
coverage, or require the plan to offer an option of equal mental health coverage. Minimum
benefit mandated states only mandate a minimum level of mental health coverage that is not
required to be equal to other medical conditions. And no mental health mandates at all means
the states do not have any regulation about mental health coverage.16 From 1992 to 2010, every
state except Wyoming had either parity laws or some type of mental health mandate.
Fig. 1 shows the states that enacted mental health parity laws in four different years. It
indicates the roll out of state parity law legislations during the research period. The data on the
regulatory regime comes from several sources, including the Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Service Administration (SAMHSA), Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS) of the U.S.
14 Broad-based mental health disorders refer to a relatively broad range of mental illness including almost any 
psychiatric, neurological, substance abuse, developmental, or intellectual disorder.
15 Specific mental health conditions usually mean major mental illness, typically defined in statute as schizophrenia,
schizoaffective, disorder, psychotic disorders, bipolar disorder, major depression, panic disorders, and obsessive-
compulsive disorder. Certain groups refer to large firms or state employees.
16 In the following empirical analysis, I use a single dummy to identify state parity law under the generalized
definition. If the state has any parity, no matter how its strength is, the dummy equals 1, if 0 otherwise even though 
it has mandate offering or minimum benefit. I do not consider the different effects of different types of parity laws
because the boundaries for these parity laws are not well defined and the rising costs of them are similar.
10
 
 
   
     
 
    
   
   
    
     
 
    
    
     
   
    
  
   
 
  
                                                          
  
 
  
Department of Health and Human Services, the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), the
National Conference of State Legislatures, the Blue Cross Blue Shield Association (BCBSA), and
specific state laws and statues.17 
In addition to the growing popularity of mental health parity laws at the state level, the
federal government also succeeded in pressing for mental benefit parity nationwide in 1996. The
Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA, effective in January 1998) requires group insurance plans to
apply the same lifetime and annual dollar limits on mental health coverage as those applied to
physical health coverage. Group health insurance plans under the federal parity context include
the plans provided by private and public sectors with more than 50 employees and the plans sold
by health insurers to employers with more than 50 employees. Comparing the extent and scope
of the MHPA to state parity legislation, the former does not go well beyond the state’s full or
nearly full parity because the statute only applies if mental health benefits are offered in an
insurance plan. From this point of view, the MHPA could be considered as a “mandate offering”
law, or even a weaker one, because it only requires the same dollar limits. However, state parity
laws exempt self-insured employer-sponsored plans because of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA). This federal preemption cuts the number of potentially affected 
workers with coverage by half. The MHPA fills this regulatory gap and thus reaches more
employees than parity at the state level.
17 All of the data sources are reliable about the year of state mandates, but inconsistencies still exist between them.
To improve the quality of policy enactment year, I use specific state laws and statues to double check if other data
sources cannot provide the consistent effective year. The specific policy coding is available upon request.
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Fig. 1. States Mental Health Parity Laws
With the sunset provision of the MHPA in 2008, a new federal law called the Mental Health
Parity Act and Addiction Equity (MHPAEA, effective in July 2010) took place in mandating non-
discriminatory coverage for mental and physical health conditions. Continuing the parity rules
required by the MHPA, the MHPAEA expands the scope of MHPA by including substance use
disorders. It also expands the MHPA requirement of parity on lifetime limits and annual dollar 
limits by adding additional protections relating to financial requirements, treatment limitations,
and out-of-network benefits. To be more specific, the financial requirements (such as
deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket limitations) imposed by group plans to
Mental Health/Substance Use Disorder (MH/SUD) benefits cannot be more restrictive than those
12
 
 
    
    
        
       
  
    
   
  
  
 
    
   
    
  
  
  
   
    
    
     
 
applicable to other medical benefits. Similarly, treatment limitations, and extra restrictions on
frequency of treatment, number of visits, days of coverage, and scope or duration of treatment,
are not allowed to apply to the MH/SUD. What is more, if a plan or insurer offers medical benefits
on an out-of-network basis, it should offer the MH/SUD benefits on an out-of-network basis too.
3. Literature Review
As discussed earlier, the labor demand and labor supply could both be affected by rising
group insurance costs and the expansion of health care access after the implementation of
mandates. Previous studies primarily focused primarily on the effect of the enactment of
mandated health benefits on related labor market consequences, such as employment, wages,
hours and weeks worked, labor input composition or some health insurance outcomes such as
group coverage and generosity of non-wage compensation.
Because mandated benefits are widely believed to increase health insurance costs, I start the
discussion from a group of literature that looks at the direct effect of rising health insurance costs
on labor market outcomes. The evidence that lower wages offset cost increases has already been
provided by previous studies (Gruber and Krueger, 1991; Sheiner, 1999; Baicker and Chandra,
2006; Kolstad and Kowalski, 2012). But the empirical findings of the change in work hours are
mixed. Culter and Madrian (1998) show that rising health costs increase the hours worked of
those with health insurance by up to 3 percent. In contrast, Baicker and Chandra (2006) estimate
that a 10 percent growth in health insurance premiums reduces hours worked by 2.4 percent
because the likelihood of a worker being part-time increases by 1.9 percentage points.
By using the variation of state and federal level legislation on group maternity benefits,
Gruber (1994) considers the labor-market effects of mandated maternity benefits and finds 
13
 
 
 
   
   
 
  
       
    
  
  
   
 
   
     
  
    
 
   
    
      
     
  
 
substantial shifting of the costs to the wages and little effect on total labor input of the targeted
group. He also investigates the presence of state regulations which mandate that group health
insurance plans must include certain benefits have little effect on the rate of insurance coverage
in another project (1994). Kaestner and Simon (2002) find that state-mandated health insurance
benefits have no statistically significant effect on wages, weeks of work and group insurance
coverage, but do increase weekly work hours from 1989 to 1998. Cseh (2008) and Lang (2013)
study the effect of enacting the state mental health parity law during several years but find no
evidence these mandates significantly affect labor market outcomes. The most recently study
about the labor market effects of parity laws is provided by Anderson (2015). Using the state by
year legislative variation between 1997 and 2001, he suggests that parity mandates improve the
labor market outcomes of workers with mental distress.
Furthermore, there are some case studies on states with other mandated regulations. Hawaii
has the most durable employer health insurance mandates in the United States: Hawaii’s Prepaid
Health Care. Hawaii’s law does not lower the wages and the employment possibilities but 
increases the reliance on part-time workers who are exempted from the law (Thurston, 1997;
Buchmueller et al. 2011). Massachusetts also has “mandated-based” health reforms. Kolstad and
Kowalski (2012) show that the jobs with employer-sponsored health insurance pay lower wages
because of the newly insured value group coverage.
The literature about mental health mandates is not limited to the labor market effect, their
impacts on mental health care service utilization and mental health have also been broadly
studied. According to most of the literature on early-stage parity laws, there is no statistically
significant evidence to show that state parity improves access to mental health care (Sturm and
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Pacula, 1999; Pacula and Sturm, 2000; Bao and Sturm, 2004). Maybe it is difficult to identify the
causal effect of mental health parity on those access or health outcomes because the law
adoption is correlated with them. To solve that, Klick and Markowitz (2006) examine the impact
of mental health insurance mandates on suicide rates at the state level with two-stage least
square estimators, but mental health mandates are still not effective in reducing suicide. As for
more recent parity laws, an increase in mental health utilization associated with these mandates 
is found for small firms (Busch and Barry, 2008). And Lang (2013) presents a reduction in suicide
rate also.
However, the evidence on the impact of state mental health parity on the labor market,
especially working time and part-time worker employment is still lacking. My study adds to the
previous literature in two ways. First, I provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the effect
of state mental health parity laws on working hours/weeks during a long time period that covers
all the development of all state parity legislations. And I also show the variation in effects among
different age groups, genders, and firm sizes. Second, I provide new evidence on the effects of
two federal mental health parity laws (the MHPA and the MHPAEA) on working time by a “reverse
experiments.” The analysis of federal mandates can further confirm my earlier findings, and
provide suggestive evidence for the mechanisms of the effect on working time.
4. The Effect of State Mental Health Parity Laws
4.1 Data and methodology
The first goal of my empirical work is to identify the effect of state mental health parity laws;
this analysis is based primarily on repeated cross-sectional data from 1992 to 2010 Current
Population Survey’s March Supplement (IPUMS-CPS, University of Minnesota). I restrict the
15
 
 
      
   
   
   
   
  
   
    
     
   
  
 
    
   
 
 
   
 
    
   
    
   
    
   
    
   
                                                          
   
  
   
  
   
  
       
    
  
  
sample to individuals aged 25 to 64 who were employed in the past year in the private sector and
were not self-employed. Limiting the sample to prime-age employees eliminates changes in
coverage due to school enrollment, parents’ coverage, or retirement. Besides abundant
individual characteristics (such as age, gender, race, marital status, the number of children, union
status, education, firm sizes, occupation, and industry), the data indicates the usual weekly hours
worked last year and weeks worked last year.18 
In Table 1, I report the summary statistics for the entire sample and the states with and without
access to mental health parity separately.19 Workers in parity states have similar hours and weeks
worked, and a slightly higher possibility of being part-time than ones in non-parity states.20 
Differences in other demographic characteristics between parity states and non-parity states are
not very striking.
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Weighted 
Means
Outcomes
All
(51)
states Parity
(28)
 states Non-Parity states (23)
Hours/week
Weeks/year
Part-time
40.576
(10.275)
47.561
(10.732)
0.069
40.421
(10.226)
47.528
(10.757)
0.072
40.791
(10.337)
47.605
(10.696)
0.066
Coverage
(0.254)
0.753
(0.431)
(0.258)
0.756
(0.430)
(0.249)
0.750
(0.433)
18 After I limit my sample to workers in private sector, both the hours and weeks worked reported by them are
positive numbers. There is no need to consider about “0” when I take the “log” on them in regression analysis.
19 Parity states represent the states with comprehensive or limited parity laws. Non-parity states refer to all other
states.
20 The latest Internal Revenue Service nondiscrimination rule (Internal Revenue Bulletin:  2015-2) defines full-time
employees are employees who are expected to work more than 30 hours/week. But part-year workers are also
exempted from the benefits. Section 1.410(a)(-3)(e)(2) (The code from Employee Plans Division) requires 1000
hours/year of service as a condition of participation, also excludes a part-time or seasonal employee. Thus, I use 25
hours/week as a cutoff of part-time workers who are most likely to be exempted from group health insurance by
assuming non-seasonal employee works at least 40 weeks/year.
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Demographics
Age 41.126 41.116 41.141
(10.381) (10.372) (10.394)
Male 0.534 0.534 0.533
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
Non-white 0.170 0.179 0.157
(0.376) (0.384) (0.364)
Married 0.630 0.624 0.638
(0.483) (0.484) (0.481)
Number of 0.197 0.196 0.198
children under 5 (0.496) (0.494) (0.499)
Less than high school 0.117 0.118 0.117
(0.322) (0.322) (0.321)
High school 0.334 0.324 0.349
(0.472) (0.468) (0.477)
Some college 0.281 0.274 0.290
(0.449) (0.446) (0.454)
Bachelor or higher degree 0.268 0.285 0.244
(0.443) (0.451) (0.430)
N 1025094 594602 430492
Notes: Supplement weights are used. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The sample used 
is pooled CPS March supplement from 1992 to 2010. Observations restricted to workers between age
25 and 64 in private sectors.
I estimate the impact of state parity laws by accessing the change in working time of workers
in states with parity from before to after policy adoption, and comparing it to the change in
working time of workers in states that do not adopt mental health parity. To control for other
determinants and any systematic shocks to the labor market outcomes of the treatment states
that are correlated with, but not due to, the enactment of parity laws, I use the basic estimating
equation as follows:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃 + 𝜖𝜖 (4)
In this equation, the dependent variable 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is one of the measures of working time for 
worker 𝑃𝑃 in state 𝑗𝑗 reported in year 𝑃𝑃. I code a state as having parity law in year 𝑃𝑃 if it had been in
effect by the last day of year 𝑃𝑃 − 1, thus 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 is a dummy variable that equals one if the
17
 
 
      
  
   
   
    
     
  
      
     
  
  
   
    
     
    
     
   
    
                                                          
  
 
   
 
state ever had a mental health parity law, and zero otherwise. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 indexes a set of individual
level characteristics: age, gender, educational attainment, race, marital status, the number of
children under five, union membership, firm size, occupation, and industry.21 The regression
specification includes state fixed effects 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖, to control for any differences across states in working
time patterns, including any working time differences between the states that adopted parity
and those that did not, and year fixed effects 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 to capture any national trends in working
hour/weeks. It also includes region-by-year effects to control for region-specific shocks over this
time period which are correlated with the passage of these laws, and state-specific time trends
can deal with the slow-moving trends in each state. The key coefficient 𝛽𝛽1 represents the effect
of state mental health parity on working time.
This method requires one identifying assumption; the trends picked up by parity laws did not
exist prior to the enactment. And it also requires that no contemporaneous shock affects the 
relative outcomes in the same state-years as parity laws. The fact that the widespread legislative
activities on mental health parity change in every state by year during an extended time period
makes the assumptions above fairly weak ones. In addition, there is one potential selection issue
about limiting the sample to individuals who have employment because parity laws may affect
the employment outcome. To relieve this concern, I examine the effect of state parity laws on
employment as one of the robustness checks in Section 7.
21 CPS March supplement re-coded the occupations and industries since 2003, and I code occupations of all these
years into six broad occupational categories using the previous version of definition before 2003. As for industries, I
group all industry codes into 11 major categories according to “Revisions to the Current Population Survey Effective
in January 2003” given by Mary Bowler, Randy E. Ilg, Stephen Miller, Ed Robison, and Anne Polivka.
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4.2 Basic results
Table 2 illustrates the regression results of equation (4): the estimates are weighted to make the
sample nationally representative. The standard errors are clustered at the state level to control for the
autocorrelation within states over time. Columns (1) to (4) report the estimators of parity laws on four
outcomes of interest separately: usual hours worked per week, weeks worked last year, whether the
worker works part-time (less than 25 hours/week), and group insurance coverage.22 Working time (such
as hours and weeks) is measured in logs. The estimated effect of mental health parity on working time
suggests that having a state mental health parity law leads to a 1.4 percent increase in weeks worked
based on column (2) (statistically significant at 1 percent level), while columns (1) and (3) show no
statistically significant effect on hours worked and the probability of being part-time workers.
As discussed above, we might expect the rising health insurance costs driven by the
enactment of state parity, or the improved productivity caused by better mental health care
access, to increase the number of weeks worked. But as for hours worked, the results could be
ambiguous because parity laws may increase the working hours of full-time workers while
simultaneously increasing the demand for low-hour workers.23 Maybe that is the reason why I
could not estimate any significant effect of parity laws on hours worked. In addition, according
to column (4), no significant result about the impact on group coverage is found. And the
covariates have their expected effects.
Table 2: The Effect of State Parity Laws on Working Time and Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log hours/week Log weeks/year Part-time ESI coverage
Parity -0.006 0.014*** 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
22 Under this context, the better measurement of coverage prevalence is having group insurance coverage under
own name, but CPS March supplement only has this information about policyholder of own name after 1996. Thus
in state parity analysis, I just use group insurance coverage. In federal experiments, I use group insurance coverage
of own name.
23 In Culter and Madrian (1998), they limit their sample to the workers who work more than 40 weeks/year.
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Age 0.012*** 
(0.001)
0.006*** 
(0.001)
-0.006*** 
(0.001)
0.012*** 
(0.001)
Age square -0.000*** 
(0.000)
-0.000*** 
(0.000)
0.000*** 
(0.000)
-0.000*** 
(0.000)
Male 0.144*** 
(0.005)
0.039*** 
(0.002)
-0.072*** 
(0.003)
-0.011*** 
(0.003)
Non-white 0.001
(0.004)
-0.011*** 
(0.002)
-0.013*** 
(0.003)
-0.057*** 
(0.008)
Married -0.019*** 
(0.003)
0.012*** 
(0.003)
0.020*** 
(0.002)
0.131*** 
(0.003)
Number of
children under 5 
-0.023***
(0.002)
-0.019***
(0.002)
0.022***
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.003)
Lower than 
high school
-0.027***
(0.004)
-0.019***
(0.005)
-0.017***
(0.003)
-0.207***
(0.012)
High school -0.016*** 
(0.003)
0.006*** 
(0.002)
-0.016*** 
(0.002)
-0.053*** 
(0.004)
Some college -0.020*** 
(0.003)
0.004* 
(0.002)
-0.004* 
(0.002)
-0.023*** 
(0.003)
Union member -0.000
(0.003)
0.014*** 
(0.003)
-0.011*** 
(0.003)
0.093*** 
(0.008)
N 195534 195534 195534 195534
Note: All regression models include the following additional variables: firm sizes (5 dummy variables),
industries (11 dummy variables), occupations (6 dummy variables), year dummy variables, state dummy
variables, state time trends and region by year dummies. Omitted education category is “bachelor or higher
degree.” Omitted firm size category is “more than 1000 employees”.
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
To further examine whether a certain age group or gender is more likely to be affected by the
state mental health parity laws, I estimate equation (4) separately by genders and for four age
groups (in 10-year age intervals) of workers and report the results in Table 3. As shown in column 
(1), state parity reduces the hours worked by 1.7 percent for workers aged 35 to 44. Column (3)
provides support for the previous hypothesis that hours are reduced because more part-time
workers are employed to avoid a higher fixed cost: parity increases the likelihood that a worker
is employed part-time by 1.8 percentage points. Furthermore, column (2) presents which kind of
employees would be more likely to increase weeks worked because of the parity law. Female
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workers and older workers (at least older than 35 years old) increase their weeks worked more
than others, as female and older age workers may have a higher risk of mental illness (World
Health Organization).
Table 3: The Effect of State Parity Laws on Working Time for Different Types of
Workers
(1) Hours/week (2) Weeks/year (3) Part-time (4) N
Gender
Men -0.008 0.009 0.003 102044
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Women -0.004 0.019*** 0.007 93490
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Age
25-34 -0.007 0.006 0.003 58219
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
35-44 -0.017** 0.011** 0.018** 63476
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
45-54 0.006 0.022*** -0.005 49687
(0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
55-64 -0.001 0.026*** -0.003 24152
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Notes: Supplement weights are used. The sample used is pooled CPS March supplement from 1992 to 
2010. Observations restricted to workers between age 25 and 64 in private sectors.
Standard errors in parentheses** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.3 The role of state parity laws in small firms
As mentioned in the state policy introduction, because of ERISA, self-insured groups are
exempted from the state regulations including mental health parity laws. Thus, state parity laws
do not impact the self-insured groups in the same way as fully insured ones; but the decision of 
being self-insured may be endogenous to state-mandated benefits. Also, the data does not
contain information on whether the worker is employed in a self-insured company. Therefore,
instead of the real status of the firm, I use firm size to proxy its likelihood of being self-insured:
among firms with less than 500 employees, only around 20 percent of them are self-insured while
more than 80 percent of larger companies with more than 500 employees are self-insured (MEPS-
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IC 2012). And almost 90 percent of firms choose self-insurance when they have more than 1000
employees. I examine the effect of state mental health parity for small groups (less than 500
employees) by allowing separate parity effects on different firm sizes in this section.24 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽4 
+𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑃 + 𝜖𝜖 (5)
In this case, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =1 if worker 𝑃𝑃 in state 𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑃𝑃 works in a small firm, otherwise it
equals zero. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽3 shown in Table 4. As expected, the effect of state
parity on weeks worked per year for small firms is almost twice as large as the effect for large
firms that are more likely to be self-insured. In column (2), the average increased weeks for having
parity differ from small firms and large firms by 0.8 percent, with small firms having a larger effect
of parity on working weeks. The covariates in the model still have their expected results.
Table 4: The Effect of State Parity Laws for Small Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log hours/week Log weeks/year Part-time ESI coverage
Parity× 0.003 0.008** 0.001 0.013
Small firm (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.012)
Parity -0.007 0.010*** 0.004 -0.002
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010)
Small firm -0.031*** -0.020*** 0.018*** -0.109*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007)
Age 0.012*** 0.006*** -0.007*** 0.013*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age square -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male 0.144*** 0.039*** -0.072*** -0.010*** 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Non-white 0.003 -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.052*** 
24 I also drop the workers in firms with 500-1000 employees and only compare the firms with less than 500
employees and firms with more than 1000 employees using equation (6), the estimation results are quite similar.
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(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
Married -0.020*** 
(0.003)
0.012*** 
(0.003)
0.020*** 
(0.002)
0.130*** 
(0.003)
Number of
children under 5
-0.023***
(0.002)
-0.019***
(0.002)
0.022***
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.003)
Lower than 
high school
-0.030***
(0.004)
-0.019***
(0.005)
-0.015***
(0.003)
-0.213***
(0.013)
High school -0.017*** 
(0.003)
0.006** 
(0.002)
-0.015*** 
(0.002)
-0.055*** 
(0.005)
Some college -0.021*** 
(0.003)
0.003* 
(0.002)
-0.004* 
(0.002)
-0.025*** 
(0.003)
Union member 0.005* 
(0.003)
0.016*** 
(0.003)
-0.015*** 
(0.003)
0.106*** 
(0.008)
N 195534 195534 195534 195534
Notes: Supplement weights are used. The sample used is pooled CPS March supplement from 1992 to
2010. Observations restricted to workers between age 25 and 64 in private sectors. Define small firm as
one with fewer than 500 employees.
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
5. The Effect of Federal Mental Health Parity Laws
5.1 Data and methodology
The second goal of this analysis is to investigate the effects of two mental health parity laws
at the federal level (effective separately in 1998 and 2010) on working time. This set of legislation
provides another distinct opportunity to check the impact of mental health parity on working
time; and further supports the findings from previous experiments using state parity laws.
Fig. 2. Experimental and Non-experimental states under MHPA
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According to the effective year of the MHPA, I am able to use five states that had already
passed parity or mandate offering laws before 1997 as non-experimental states, because their
state parity laws are stronger than the federal law, and their health insurance costs are not
significantly affected by the federal parity law. On the other side, the 28 states that had not
enacted parity laws before 2001 are experimental.25 However, the remaining 18 states with state
parity law changes during 1997 to 2000 cannot be studied simultaneously to identify the impact
of the MHPA, because the years 1997 to 2000 include the periods before and after the federal
law was put in place (1998). In this case, the enactment of these state parity laws will provide
counterfactual trends; thus, I dropped these 18 states from the sample. The experimental, non-
experimental and dropped states are shown in Panel A of Fig. 2. And I use year 1997 and 1998
(before), and year 2000 and 2001 (after) the CPS March supplement to study the earlier federal
law, the MHPA.26 
However, for a limitation of this MHPA experiment is that only five states can be used as non-
experimental states, and they are limited to three regions: New England, South Atlantic, and
West North-Central. To find more powerful experimental states that are more like these five non-
experimental states, I only keep 10 experimental states from New England, South Atlantic, and
West North-Central, while dropping other experimental states. Thus, I have another set of
experimental states that are used to compare with non-experimental states before and after the
MHPA. They are shown in Panel B of Fig. 2. Table 5 contains standard demographic information
by state status during the MHPA study period, for the two sets of experimental states. There are
25 Among the firms with more than 50 employees in states that do not have state parity laws, 86% of them are
complying with MHPA 1996 while only 55% complied before 1996. And there is no employer drop the coverage
according to a survey of US GAO (2000).
26 To provide sufficient time to examine the effect of MHPA, I drop the year 1999.
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not many striking differences between experimental and non-experimental states: only a small
disparity on a number of children and education level.
Compared to MHPA, the MHPAEA, which is the federal law that followed, requires stronger
mental health parity; thus, it may impact the labor market more substantially than the earlier
law.27 Furthermore, one advantage of this later “federal experiment” is that by its later
enactment year (2008), over half of the states had already passed their own parity or mandate
offering laws, and no states changed the law after that. Therefore, I am able to use all states to
broadly represent the country. In this case, the experimental states are those that had not passed
parity or mandate offering laws before 2009, and the non-experimental states are those that
already had their own laws. Fig. 3 presents 18 experimental states and 33 non-experimental
states. The MHPAEA went into effect in 2010. Therefore, I use the year 2009 and 2010 as pre-
period and 2012 and 2013 as post-period. Column (1) and (2) in Panel A of Table 6 present the
means of demographic characteristics for the MHPAEA experimental states and non-
experimental states. Once again, the two sets of states are relatively similar: the experimental
states have slightly lower educational levels and higher rates of non-white.
27 Even with all of the state parity laws as well as MHPA, there still exist differences in group health insurance for
MH/SA. Before MHPAEA, coverage for mental health care often required a higher level of cost sharing (e.g.,
coinsurance of 50 percent compared with 20 percent for outpatient medical services) and treatment limits (e.g.,
twenty outpatient visits and thirty inpatient days per year). Thus the requirements of MHPAEA can eliminate these
historical differences further and aim to create the comprehensive “mental health parity”.
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Table 5: Demographic Characteristics by Treatment Status:
MHPA1996 
Panel A: All regions Panel B: Limited regions:
(1)Experimental (2)Non- (3)Experimental (4)Non-
States: 28 experimental States: 10 experimental
States: 5 States: 5
Age 40.813 40.813 40.981 40.813
(10.122) (10.057) (10.239) (10.057)
Male 0.530 0.522 0.524 0.522
(0.499) (0.500) (0.499) (0.500)
Non-white 0.149 0.152 0.154 0.152
(0.356) (0.359) (0.361) (0.359)
Married 0.636 0.651 0.625 0.651
(0.481) (0.477) (0.484) (0.477)
Number of 0.196 0.208 0.184 0.208
children under 5 (0.496) (0.509) (0.478) (0.509)
Less than 0.115 0.079 0.121 0.079
high school (0.319) (0.270) (0.326) (0.270)
High school 0.354 0.332 0.354 0.332
(0.478) (0.471) (0.478) (0.471)
Some college 0.281 0.280 0.276 0.280
(0.450) (0.449) (0.447) (0.449)
Bachelor or 0.250 0.309 0.249 0.309
higher degree (0.433) (0.462) (0.432) (0.462)
N 139670 15181 41091 15181
Notes: Supplement weights are used. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The sample used
is pooled CPS March supplement from 1997 to 2001. Observations restricted to workers between age 25
and 64 in private sectors. Limited regions: New England, South Atlantic, West North-Central.
Fig. 3. Experimental and Non-experimental states under MHPAEA
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Table 6: Demographic Characteristics by Treatment Status: MHPAEA2008
Panel A: All states by status Panel B: Control states by firm size
(2)Non-
(1)Experimental experimental (3)Large firms (4)Small firms
states (18) states (33) (>500 employees) (<500 employees)
Age 42.740 42.578 42.720 42.469
(10.982) (10.937) (10.908) (10.959)
Male 0.532 0.532 0.520 0.541
(0.499) (0.499) (0.500) (0.498)
Non-white 0.168 0.212 0.232 0.197
(0.374) (0.409) (0.422) (0.398)
Married 0.607 0.600 0.606 0.596
(0.488) (0.490) (0.489) (0.491)
Number of 0.179 0.180 0.183 0.177
children under 5 (0.482) (0.477) (0.481) (0.475)
Less than high 0.100 0.095 0.058 0.123
school (0.300) (0.293) (0.234) (0.329)
High school 0.311 0.290 0.260 0.313
(0.463) (0.454) (0.439) (0.464)
Some college 0.298 0.281 0.291 0.274
(0.457) (0.450) (0.454) (0.446)
Bachelor 0.291 0.334 0.391 0.290
or higher degree (0.454) (0.472) (0.488) (0.454)
N 104638 202912 87275 115637
Note: Supplement weights are used. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. The sample used is
pooled CPS March supplement from 2009 to 2013. Observations restricted to workers between age 25 and
64 in private sectors.
The effects of the MHPA and MHPAEA on working time can both be estimated from the
equation as follows:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽2 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖 (6)
In this equation, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 equals one if the state is experimental and zero otherwise.
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is a dummy for the after-law period (1 if post-federal, 0 if pre-federal). Along with
demographic covariates, it also contains state and year fixed effects and region-by-year effects.
𝛽𝛽1 captures the variation in outcomes specific to the experimental states in the years after the
enactment of federal parity laws. It is the difference-in-differences estimate of the extent of
shifting of the costs of federal parity laws to working time. The underlying assumption for a valid
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identification is that without federal parity laws, the working time or other related labor market
outcomes should follow similar trends for both experimental states and non-experimental states
during the post-period. The relevant assumption and robustness checks will be provided in
Section 7.
As discussed above, the federal parity law fills the regulatory gap created by ERISA. Contrary
to state mental health parity laws, federal parity law can influence the behavior of self-insured
firms if they provide mental health coverage with discriminations. However, separately
estimating the effects for fully insured and self-insured firms in experimental states is not feasible
because both types of firms are simultaneously affected by federal parity. Nevertheless, among
the 33 non-experimental states that had already adopted state mental health parity before 2009,
the MHPAEA is supposed to have a more sizeable impact on self-insured firms. Limiting the
sample to those non-experimental states, I use large firms (more than 500 employees, more likely
to be self-insured) as the treatment group and other firms as the control group, to further
investigate the effect of the MHPAEA using a difference-in-differences estimation.28 Column (3)
and (4) in Panel B of Table 6 report the means of demographic characteristics for large firms and
small firms.29 The regression framework has the following form:
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝛽𝛽3 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖 (7)
28 I also drop the workers in firms with 500-1000 employees to only compare the firms with more than 1000
employees and firms with less than 500 employees. The estimators of the key variables are similar with results
reported in Table 9.
29 The similar methodology can be also used in “MHPA experiment” to identify the effect of the earlier federal law
for self-insured firms. But there are only five non-experimental states in “MHPA experiment,” and the pre-trends in 
labor market outcomes between large firms and small firms are not very similar. Therefore, I do not report the 
results in this section.
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In equation (6), 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =1 if worker 𝑃𝑃 in state 𝑗𝑗 in year 𝑃𝑃 works in a large firm, otherwise
it is 0. The key variable is 𝛽𝛽2, which measures the effect of the MHPAEA on working time among
self-insured firms. The remaining part of this regression has a similar analogy with equation (5).
5.2 The results of the MHPA experiment
Panel A in Table 7 reports the estimation results of the key variable in equation (5) when
comparing 28 experimental states and five non-experimental states in all regions. The
insignificant coefficients of the interaction term from column (1) to (4) imply that the MHPA, the
1996 federal parity law, does not significantly change these labor market outcomes. In addition,
I re-estimate the effect of the MHPA using another set of experimental states. These ten states
are limited to three specific regions where the original five non-experimental states are located.
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 7. Once again, it still shows that the MHPA has little
effect on working time.
There are two reasons to believe that the MHPA has limited ability to impact working time.
First, the MHPA is a relatively weak federal parity law compared to other state parity laws; the
requirement of its mandated benefits may not be binding with the existing group health plan
design, especially in large firms. In this scenario, the costs of providing group health insurance
coverage may not substantially increase after the implementation of the MHPA. Second, as a
major symbolic accomplishment, the MHPA prompts state legislatures to step into more
comprehensive parity laws. One disadvantage is that several parity law enactments have been
pushing around the approved and effective year of the MHPA (1997 to 2001). Then, I lost many
observations in the empirical work of the MHPA since these states are dropped to rule out these
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counterfactual factors. But the MHPAEA enacted in 2008 should be able to fix this issue, and the
relevant results are provided as follows.
Table 7: The Effect of MHPA1996 on Working Time and Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log hours/week Log weeks/year Part-time ESI own coverage
Panel A: All regions
Experimental -0.000 -0.006 0.003 0.013
States×Post (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.017)
N 27575 27575 27575 27575
Panel B: Limited 
regions
Experimental -0.000 -0.005 0.002 0.012
States×Post (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.017)
N 10517 10517 10517 10517
Note: Both regression models include demographic characteristics, firm sizes (5 dummy variables),
industries (11 dummy variables), occupations (6 dummy variables), year dummy variables, state dummy
variables, and region by year dummies. Omitted education category is “bachelor or higher degree.” Omitted 
firm size category is “more than 1000 employees”.
Standard errors in parentheses
5.3 The results of the MHPAEA experiment
The 2008 federal law known as the MHPAEA can be studied within the same DD framework
used in the empirical work to study the MHPA, with changes in choosing experimental and non-
experimental states, as well as pre-post periods. The results are shown in Table 8. There is
evidence of increasing weeks worked/year associated with MHPAEA enactment. In column (2),
the treatment effect of MHPAEA is: having federal law increases the weeks worked by 1.7 percent
and is significant at the 99 percent level. The magnitude is quite similar to the effect of state
mental health parity laws. However, there is still no significant effect on hours worked/week, the 
probability of being part-time workers, and group insurance coverage of own name.30 Overall, to
the extent that the effect of the MHPAEA on working time is correctly estimated, this 2008
30 I use coverage of own name in both of the federal law experiments because of the data availability.
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federal law is stronger than the MHPA; thus, it causes costs to rise more and makes the labor 
demand and labor supply shift more. And the experiment of the MHPAEA is thus able to support
the previous findings of state parity laws; mental health parity laws do increase the weeks
worked.
The estimated results of the key variable in equation (6) are shown in Table 9. The estimators
show no significant treatment effect of the MHPAEA on working time for large firms compared
to small ones. This lack of an effect may be because the health plans offered by large firms already
had comprehensive coverage for mental health care, even in the absence of parity laws. This
federal mandate is not binding for large firms; the health plan benefits and their generosity do
not need to redesign much to comply with the requirements of the MHPAEA.
Table 8: The Effect of MHPAEA2008 on Working Time and Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log hours/week Log weeks/year Part-time ESI own coverage
Experimental
States×Post
0.007
(0.007)
0.017***
(0.004)
-0.007
(0.005)
0.015
(0.010)
N 36162 36162 36162 36162
Note: The regression models include demographic characteristics, firm sizes (5 dummy variables),
industries (11 dummy variables), occupations (6 dummy variables), year dummy variables, state dummy
variables, and region by year dummies. Omitted education category is “bachelor or higher degree.” Omitted 
firm size category is “more than 1000 employees”.
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 9: The Effect of MHPAE2008 for Large Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log hours/week Log weeks/year Part-time ESI own coverage
Large firm× Post 0.007 -0.013 -0.002 0.015
(0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012)
N 23752 23752 23752 23752
Notes: The samples are limited in 33 non-experiment states of “MHPAEA experiment.” Define large firm as
one with more than 500 employees.
Standard errors in parentheses
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6. Robustness Checks
6.1 The effect of mental health parity laws on employment
I restrict my sample to individuals who have employment in the above econometric analysis
because they are the most affected by parity laws. However, there is a concern that the
estimators would be biased if mental health parity laws also significantly change employment 
itself. As discussed in the previous literature, the labor supply may increase if the employees
value the mental health coverage. On the other hand, employers may decrease the labor demand
of health insurance covered workers while becoming more reliant on part-time workers to avoid
higher fixed costs. Thus, the effect of mental health parity laws on employment equilibrium is
uncertain. In light of this potential sample selection problem, I check whether state or federal
mental health parity laws have impacts on employment and labor participation with similar
regression specifications used above. The results of state mental health parity laws, the MHPA
federal law (for two sets of experimental states) and the MHPAEA federal law, are shown
separately in Table 10 and Table 11. There is no evidence of significant effects on employment or
labor participation.31 
31 The pre-post trends in employment and labor participation are shown in Appendix. Both the experimental states
and non-experimental states have roughly similar patterns before and after the enactment of MHPA/MHPAEA.
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Table 10: The Effect of Parity Laws on Employment and Labor Participation
Parity
(1)
Employment
0.003
(0.002)
(2)
Labor participation
-0.001
(0.001)
Age 0.004*** 
(0.000)
0.003*** 
(0.000)
Age square -0.000*** 
(0.000)
-0.000*** 
(0.000)
Male 0.008*** 
(0.002)
0.007*** 
(0.000)
Non-white -0.026*** 
(0.002)
-0.002*** 
(0.000)
Married 0.030*** 
(0.001)
0.001** 
(0.000)
Number of children under 5 -0.006*** 
(0.001)
-0.003*** 
(0.000)
Lower than high school -0.050*** 
(0.003)
-0.005*** 
(0.001)
High school -0.015*** 
(0.001)
-0.001*** 
(0.000)
Some college -0.009*** 
(0.000)
-0.001*** 
(0.000)
N
Mean of Dep.Var.
1392406
0.752
1392406
0.793
6.2 Identification assumptions
In considering the identification strategy of studying the effect of federal parity laws on
working time, the interpretation of the preceding results is based on one fundamental
assumption: in the absence of federal parity laws, the labor market outcomes I check in Section
6 would have similar trends during the post-period. This section seeks to verify this assumption
by providing the pre- and post- trends of outcomes of interest for both the 1996 and 2008 federal
laws.
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Table 11: The Effect of Federal Parity Laws on Employment and Labor Participation
MHPA: All states
(1) (2)
Employment Labor
participation
MHPA: Limited regions
(3) (4)
Employment Labor
participation
MHPAEA
(5)
Employment
(6)
Labor
participation
Experimental
States×Post
Age
Age square
Male
Non-white
Married
Number of
children under
5
Lower than 
high school
High school
Some college
-0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.002)
0.004*** 0.003*** 
(0.001) (0.000)
-0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000)
0.007*** 0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.001)
-0.023*** -0.003*** 
(0.003) (0.001)
0.021*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
-0.004** -0.003***
(0.002) (0.0006)
-0.039*** -0.004**
(0.003) (0.002)
-0.010*** -0.001** 
(0.002) (0.001)
-0.005*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
-0.001 0.001
(0.006) (0.002)
0.004*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.001)
-0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000)
0.006** 0.005*** 
(0.002) (0.001)
-0.021*** -0.002** 
(0.006) (0.001)
0.017*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
-0.002 -0.003**
(0.002) (0.001)
-0.032*** -0.007**
(0.003) (0.003)
-0.007*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
-0.007*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.001)
0.004
(0.003)
0.004*** 
(0.000)
-0.000*** 
(0.000)
0.002
(0.003)
-0.031*** 
(0.002)
0.043*** 
(0.002)
-0.005***
(0.001)
-0.062***
(0.005)
-0.029*** 
(0.002)
-0.018*** 
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.002*** 
(0.000)
-0.000*** 
(0.000)
0.004*** 
(0.000)
-0.001** 
(0.000)
0.001** 
(0.000)
-0.002***
(0.0003)
-0.003***
(0.001)
-0.001** 
(0.000)
-0.001*** 
(0.001)
N
Mean of
Dep.Var.
206419 206419
0.773 0.803
75799 75799
0.791 0.817
421183
0.717
421183
0.779
Note: All regression models include the following additional variables: industries (11 dummy variables),
occupations (6 dummy variables), year dummy variables, state dummy variables, region by year dummies.
Omitted education category is “bachelor or higher degree”.
Standard errors in parentheses
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Fig. 4 compares the trends of experimental states with non-experimental states in four labor
market outcomes of interest before and after the implementation of the MHPA (I use a one-year 
lag for the actual effective year to provide a longer time for behavior adjustment). Panel A-Panel 
D report four labor market outcomes of interest: usually hours worked per week, weeks worked
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last year, percent of part-time workers and ESI coverage under own name. The pre-trends of two
sets of states before 1999 are a little noisy, and there is no substantial increase or decrease in
any of the outcomes after 1999. The comparisons of experimental states and non-experimental
states in limited regions are also provided in Fig. 5. They have similar patterns with the plots using
all regions. According to these plots, it is inconclusive as to whether the MHPA impacts the
outcomes, which is consistent with the results of previous econometric regressions.
Fig. 4. Trends in four outcomes for MHPA
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Fig. 5. Trends in four outcomes for MHPA in the limited regions
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The MHPAEA provides better experimental and non-experimental states for estimating the
DD estimator. Using a regression framework, I find this later federal parity increases the weeks
for the experimental states. The pre-trends are reported in Fig. 6 and very similar trends in every
outcome before the MHPAEA (the year 2011) are found, but a slightly increasing trend for
experimental states compare to non-experimental states shortly after MHPAEA was
implemented. Thus the concern that the increased weeks worked is coming from pre-existing
patterns can be relieved.
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Fig. 6. Trends in four outcomes for MHPAEA
39 
39.5 
40 
40.5 
41 
41.5 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel A. Hours/week 
Experimental states 
Non-experimental states 
46 
46.5 
47 
47.5 
48 
48.5 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel B. Weeks/year 
Experimental states 
Non-experimental states 
Panel C. Part-time workers percent 
0.1 
0.09 
0.08 
0.07 
0.06 
0.05 
0.04 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Experimental states 
Non-experimental states 
0.5 
0.53 
0.56 
0.59 
0.62 
0.65 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Panel D. ESI own coverage 
Experimental states 
Non-experimental states 
Along with the trend comparisons between experimental states and non-experimental states,
I also plot the pre- and after- trends of large firms (>500 employees) and small firms (<500
employees) in non-experimental states. Fig. 7 indicates that between 2009 and 2013, all four
outcomes of large firms and small firms exhibit roughly similar trends before and after the
implementation of the MHPAEA. It is also consistent with the regression results that no much of
the change is driven by the MHPAEA in the analysis above.
37
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
   
   
  
  
  
  
 
Fig. 7. Trends in four outcomes for MHPAEA in non-experimental states
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7. Discussion about the mechanisms of increasing working time
In this section, I would like to revisit and discuss the mechanisms related to the causal effect
of mental health parity laws on working time. Recall that the whole story can be separated into
the labor demand side and the labor supply side. An increase in health insurance costs caused by
the implementation of parity may decrease labor demand, and provide further incentives for 
employers to ask for longer working time when the costs cannot transfer to wages completely.
On the other side, extensive and intensive labor supply may both increase if employees want to
take advantage of the new mandated benefits. The first order effect on the labor demand and
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labor supply is not the whole story; workers could also work for a longer time if mental health
parity laws improve their mental health outcomes. Because of data limitation, the estimates of
mental health parity laws cannot imply which channel is the most significant mechanism for
increased weeks empirically.
Theoretically, although increasing mental health coverage is a necessary precondition for
improvement of mental health care utilization and mental health outcomes, the expansions in
benefits may not translate into increased utilization and better health. Most of the literature
does not find substantial evidence on the effect of parity on either mental health care utilization
or mental health outcomes, especially for the early-stage parity laws.32 The state and federal
experiments show similar positive effects on working weeks whether mental health outcomes
have improved or not. Thus, if the evidence on the impact of mental health parity laws on health
service utilization and mental health is lacking, the possibility that workers increase their working
time because they have better mental health associated with parity laws is small.
Additionally, mental health is also found to have a significant influence on employment while
the effect is limited to working time (Ettner et al, 1997). Because even though employees can
obtain better mental health care utilization and mental health because of parity laws, their
working time may not increase. One of the possibilities is that, in this scenario, better access may
make covered employees spend more time on psychological therapy or psychologist visits and
reduce the working time.
32 See Section 3 for more details about the existing literature on the effect of parity on mental health care access
and mental health conditions.
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To provide more suggestive evidence for the mechanisms, I re-estimate the effect of state
mental health parity laws on working time and group insurance coverage by allowing separate
effects on metropolitan and non-metropolitan counties. Metropolitan areas usually own a high
degree of economic and social interaction, and of course, significantly more mental health
services, such as community mental health centers, community hospitals with psychiatric units
and state-operated hospitals.33 Rural counties have the fewest average mental health
professionals per capita (Ellis, Konrad, Thomas and Morrissey, 2009). If the increased working
weeks are coming from better mental health, the areas with more mental health services should
be more likely to be affected by the parity dummy.34 Table 12 reports the results and shows there
is no significant difference between the effects on metro-county and non-metro-county. Thus, I 
would like to assume that the working time increased by parity laws implies either an increase in
health insurance costs or an outward shift in the labor supply curve, but not an improvement of
mental health outcomes. The results cannot be served as evidence on the benefit side of parity
laws at least for the general population.
Table 12: The Effect of Parity Laws for Metropolitan Area
Parity
(1)
Log hours/week
-0.001
(0.006)
(2)
Log weeks/year
0.011* 
(0.006)
(3)
Part-time
0.005
(0.005)
(4)
ESI coverage
0.006
(0.011)
Metro× Parity -0.005
(0.006)
0.004
(0.005)
-0.0007
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.010)
Metro 0.001
(0.003)
0.005
(0.005)
0.0005
(0.003)
0.021*** 
(0.005)
N 195534 195534 195534 195534
Note: Metropolitan area includes central city, outside central city and central city status unknown.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, *** p < 0.01
33 These are the primary resources that individuals with mental illness can get medical supports from in the US.
34 My results of interaction terms of parity laws and firm size can also imply similar conclusions. Because the health
plans of large firms often have more access to mental health services, but the effect is still greater for small firms.
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8. Conclusions
The evidence in this study supports that the implementation of mental health parity laws
does increase the intensive labor supply margin: weeks worked. With well-supported 
identification assumptions, my findings of the effects of state and federal parity laws are robust 
to a variety of specifications of the regulations. First of all, the development of state legislatures
about mental health parity provides abundant state-by-year variation from 1992 to 2010.
Furthermore, the MHPA, effective in 1998, and the MHPAEA, effective in 2010, also offer
opportunities to do “reverse experiments.” By comparing the states that had already adopted
state parity before the federal laws and states that had not, the effect of federal parity laws can
be examined and the previous findings of state parity can have further support. Last but not least,
the self-insured firms (most of the large firms) are exempted from the regulations of state
mandates while federal parity laws fix this regulatory gap created by ERISA. Thus, the effects of
state and federal parity laws on working time should vary by different firm sizes. I also estimate
the effect of state parity laws for small firms and the effect of federal parity laws on large firms
separately, by adding the interaction term of parity legislation and firm size.
The estimates indicate weeks worked per year increase significantly because of the
implementation of state mental health parity and federal mental health parity, the MHPAEA.
Comparing to self-insured firms, this effect of state mental parity for fully insured firms is more
substantial. Additionally, even though there is no evidence to imply that having mental health
parity laws significantly impacts hours worked for the whole sample, it decreases the hours
worked while it increases the probability of working part-time for workers aged 35 to 44. These
results support the convention that adding requirements of equal coverage of mental health and
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physical health does increase the fixed costs of providing group coverage, and the employers who
are affected by parity laws are more likely to ask their workers to work a longer time to
compensate the higher fixed costs. Also, workers value the benefits and would like to work longer
to take advantage of them.
These results on mental health parity laws have suggestive implications for other policies
designed to cover the uninsured and mandate comprehensive benefits. It is also necessary to
highlight that federal parity law, the MHPAEA, is still effective after the full implementation of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). This new health care reform, which was
passed by Congress and signed into law by President Barak Obama in 2010, specifies that the
PPACA will extend the applicability of the MHPAEA.35 Based on the experiment of this federal
parity law, one of the policy implications can be to illustrate that the effect of the PPACA, which
can be considered as a full mandate for health insurance coverage. Compliance with the PPACA
may increase the fixed costs of hiring covered workers or motivate ineligible employees to work
for a longer time. Thus, it may impact relevant labor market outcomes more substantially than
other types of single mandated benefit.
At last, this analysis focuses only on the intensive margin of labor force participation; the goal
of the paper is not trying to study the incidence of mental health parity laws completely. I have
focused purely on the hypothesis that working time will be longer when employers encounter a
higher fixed cost of employment and employees value their health benefits. The results of my
analysis detect a similar effect found by Cutler and Madrian (1998), although they focus on hours
35 The PPACA expands the reach of MHPAEA to three main types of plans: qualified health plans, Medicaid non-
managed care benchmark and benchmark-equivalent plans, and plans of individual market.
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worked and I only find evidence in weeks. Because they only look at the full-year workers and I
include all types of workers. In addition, I solely look at the effect of mental health parity law on
the financing side and efficiency costs instead of the potential benefits of these mandates. The
benefit and cost analysis of mental health parity laws remains an area of priority for future policy
research.
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Appendix
Table A1: The effect of state and federal mental health parity laws on hourly wages
(1) Log hourly wage (state parity) (2) Log hourly wage (2010 federal parity)
Parity 0.010
(0.009)
Experimental States×Post 0.008
(0.015)
N 194842 36067
Note: The hourly wage is calculated from information in the CPS on wage and salary income in last year
divided by weeks worked and hours worked last year. Drop the missing wages and wages less than $1 or
more than $400. Thus the sample sizes in Table A2 are 0.4percent smaller than in Table 2 and 8.
Fig. A1. Trends in employment and labor participation for MHPA
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Fig. A2. Trends in employment and labor participation for MHPA in limited regions
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Fig. A3. Trends in employment and labor participation for MHPAEA
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